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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Respondent, 
vs. 
MILO SIMONS, 
Defendant / Petitioner. 
Case No: 20110842-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER UPON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
&&*& 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
As a preliminary matter, Simons recognizes that this Court may affirm the trial 
court's ruling on the grounds initially held by the trial court (that the officer had 
reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate Simons as a passenger based on the 
evidence of paraphernalia found in the driver's door), rather than the grounds held by the 
Court of Appeals (that the officer's questioning of Simons did not measurably extend the 
detention). "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed 
from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record...'" Bailey 
v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, U 10, 52 P.3d 1158. The initial argument in the State's brief is 
directed at supporting the trial court's reasoning, and its second argument is directed at 
the argument underlying the holding of the Utah Court of Appeals. Simons disagrees 
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with both the decisions of the trial court and the court of appeals. However, even if this 
Court chooses to affirm the trial court based on a finding of reasonable suspicion to 
investigate Simons as a passenger (the trial court's finding), Simons asserts it is 
appropriate for this Court to address the holding of the Court of Appeals as well, where it 
deals with the scope and reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment detention/seizure, 
because of this Court's significant interest in establishing state-wide standards to guide 
law enforcement and prosecutorial officials in this area. See State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, 
t 7, 229 P.3d 650 ("there must be state-wide standards"); State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, t 
14, 103 P.3d 699 (in consent search cases there should be uniform legal rules); State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, j^ 25, 63 P.3d 650 (there should be state-wide standards in search 
and seizure cases to "help ensure different trial judges will reach the same legal 
conclusions in cases that have little factual difference."); State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, 
P.3d 590. Therefore, Simons asks this Court to address the question of whether or not the 
police measurably extended the traffic stop even if the trial court's denial is affirmed on 
other grounds, 
1. The police did not have reasonable suspicion that Simons, as a passenger, was 
involved in criminal activity to independently justify his detention 
The first point in the State's brief is because Simons was in the car with the driver 
who was suspected of DUI and possession of drug paraphernalia the police had 
reasonable suspicion or even probable cause to detain or arrests Simons. Respondent's 
Brief at 10-17. The State claims that, because the degree of proof necessary for an 
investigative detention is "modest" (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-
2 
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80, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975)) and detention is "permissible if the officer's 
suspicion cis supported by specific and articulable facts as well as any rational inferences 
drawn from those facts'" {State v. Alverez, 2006 UT 61, [^14, 147 P.3d 425), the police 
here were justified in detaining and investigating Simons based on the evidence observed 
implicating the driver/co-defendant. Respondent's Brief at 11-12. The State cites several 
United States Supreme Court cases to support its claim that Deputy Luke was justified in 
investigating Simons based upon the evidence discovered in the driver's side door 
compartment. The most relevant of which are Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 
S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 
157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003), and United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed 
201 (1948). Respondent's Brief at 14-17. Simons now responds to the State's position 
with a closer examination of those cases and asserts that factual differences make this 
case distinguishable. 
The State argues that under Pringle, because Simons "and his companion were in 
a relatively small automobile, not a public tavern" the police were justified in making the 
inference that "the passenger is engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and [that 
both] have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing." 
Respondent's Brief at 16-17 (citation omitted). The State argues if "discovery of 
contraband in the backseat of a car satisfies the probable cause burden for arresting a 
front seat passenger", as it did in Pringle, then "Deputy Luke's discovery of chewed 
paraphernalia in the driver's door certainly satisfies" the less demanding requirement of 
reasonable suspicion. Respondent's Brief at 17. The State suggests that the quantitative 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
difference between proof necessary for probable cause and proof necessary for 
reasonable suspicion should require that the evidence here satisfies the lower threshold. 
However, a comparison of the facts in Pringle to the facts in this case reveals a 
qualitative difference between the evidence, and that qualitative difference suggests the 
police here had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to suspect Simons was 
involved in any criminal activity and was merely in close proximity to a person who was. 
In Pringle the police stopped a passenger vehicle, occupied by three men, for 
speeding. "The officer asked [the driver] for his license and registration" and when he 
"opened the glove compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration, the officer observed a 
large amount of rolled-up money in the glove compartment." Pringle, 540 U.S. at 368. 
After the driver's information did not return any outstanding violations the "officer 
returned to the stopped car, had [the driver] get out, and issued him an oral warning." 
Pringle, at 386. A second officer then asked if the driver "had any weapons or narcotics 
in the vehicle" and the driver "indicated that he did not" and "consented to a search of the 
vehicle," M, at 386. "The search yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five 
plastic baggies containing cocaine from behind the back-seat armrest." Id. 
The police "questioned all three men about the ownership of the drugs and 
money" but the "men offered no information" and all three were placed under arrest and 
transported to the police station. Id., at 368-69. The defendant, the front seat passenger, 
moved to suppress a confession he later made arguing it was "the fruit of an illegal 
arrest" but the motion was denied because the trial court found there was probable cause 
to arrest him. Id., at 369. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed his conviction 
4 
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"holding that, absent specific facts tending to show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or 
control over the drugs, 'the mere finding of cocaine in the back armrest when Pringle was 
a front seat passenger in a car being driven by its owner is insufficient to establish 
probable cause for an arrest for possession.'" Id., at 369 (citing Pringle, 370 Md. 525, 
545, 805 A.2d 1016, 1027 (Md. 2002)). 
The United States Supreme Court granted cert. "It [was] uncontested... that the 
officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine baggies containing suspected cocaine, 
had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed... The sole question [before 
the Court was] whether the officer had probable cause to believe Pringle", the front seat 
passenger, "committed that crime." Id., at 370. "To determine whether an officer had 
probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and 
then decide 'whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively 
reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause..." Id., at 371 (citing Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). 
The Court concluded "it an entirely reasonable inference... that any or all three of 
the occupants had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine" 
based on the fact that there was $763 in cash in the glove box directly in front of the 
defendant and there was five bags of cocaine behind the backseat armrest and accessible 
to all three men. Id., at 372. Additionally, the Court noted that Pringle, like Houghton 
and unlike Ybarra, involved individuals riding together in a car so it "was reasonable for 
the officer to infer a common enterprise among the three men" because the nature of the 
enterprise (drug dealing) is one "which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent 
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person with the potential to furnish evidence against him." Id., at 373. The Court noted 
that unlike the facts in Ybarra, where patrons of a bar were not allowed to be searched 
based on "mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity" 
"absent individualized suspicion", the fact that Pringle was in the car with large 
quantities of drugs and cash gave the police reason to believe he was involved. Id, at 
373. The Court also noted, unlike Di Re where there was "no information implicating" 
the defendant other than presence in the vehicle with a suspect who had been identified, 
neither of Pringle's companions were singled out by the evidence and therefore each of 
them were as likely to have been attached to the contraband. Id., at 373-34. Quoting 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979), the Court said 
"[w]here the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported 
by probable cause particularized with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be 
undercut or avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists 
probable cause to search or seize another..." Pringle, at 372-73. 
Although this is not a case where probable cause was required, the principle is the 
same, when a person is being investigated (as opposed to a place) reasonable suspicion 
must be particularized with respect to that person.1 
1
 "Under the Fourth Amendment, government officials may conduct an investigatory stop 
of a vehicle if they possess 'reasonable suspicion: a particularized and objective basis for 
suspecting that particular person stopped of criminal activity... Such reasonable 
suspicion 'requires specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and 
reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in 
criminal conduct.'" United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 
United States v. Thomas, 211 F.Ed. 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
6 
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The qualitative factual distinctions between Pringle and this case significantly 
weaken the State's position. First, the evidence discovered in Pringle was either closer to 
or as close to the passenger defendant as it was the other vehicle occupants. But the 
evidence here, the paraphernalia in the driver's door compartment, was solely within the 
driver's reach and likely only within the drivers knowledge. In Pringle the money 
evidence was in the glove compartment, directly in front of the defendant as the front seat 
passenger {Pringle, at 368, 372), and the drug evidence was found behind the upright 
armrest in the back-seat, "accessible to all three men" {Pringle, at 368, 372) including the 
defendant. But here the evidence of intoxication was limited to the driver and the 
paraphernalia evidence was discovered in the driver's side door compartment (R.48, 
R.92: 6, 8, 23, 24, 25), well away from the reach, view, and control of the front seat 
passenger. The officer testified that it only came into view after the driver's door was 
opened even though that same officer had already looked into the vehicle from the 
passenger window, suggesting that Simons could not have seen it with from the 
passenger seat. R.92: 5-7. 
Next, the evidence in Pringle suggested the crime was drug dealing, {Pringle, at 
373 ("[t]he quantity of drugs and cash in the car indicated a likelihood of drug dealing")), 
while the evidence here suggested DUI, possession of paraphernalia and possibly prior 
use of a controlled substance (R.92: 6 (driver had bloodshot eyes, rapid speech and 
movement), 92: 8 (baggies commonly used to store drugs), 92: 8 (powder and crystal 
residue in the bags). The important distinction from Pringle is that drug dealing was 
found to be "an enterprise to which a dealer would be unlikely to admit an innocent 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
person with the potential to furnish evidence against him" (i.e. large amounts of cash and 
drugs), which leads to the inference that someone in the presence of such evidence is 
likely to be involved, while the evidence of DUI, paraphernalia, and prior use should not 
generate the same inference. Pringle, at 374. 
Thus, the evidence in Pringle, which created a legitimate inference of criminal 
activity to all of the passengers in the vehicle, is qualitatively different from the evidence 
discovered in this case. Had the paraphernalia in this case been in plain view in the 
console between Sorenson and Simons, or had the officers reported similar evidence of 
impairment in Simons then such an inference may be warranted. But where all the 
evidence pointed only to, and directly to, the driver the police did not have any specific 
and articulable suspicion, objective or otherwise, to support a belief that Simons was 
engaged in criminal activity. 
The State argues that under Houghton "it is reasonable in such cases to believe 
that the passenger is 'engaged in a common enterprise with the driver, and [that both] 
have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing.'" 
Respondent's Brief at 17 {citing Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, at 304-05). The State asserts 
under Houghton "Deputy Luke's discovery of chewed paraphernalia in the driver's door 
certainly satisfies the 'less demanding' reasonable suspicion burden... that is required for 
making the much 'less intrusive' investigative query..." Respondent's Brief at 17 
(internal cites omitted). The State claims "Deputy Luke would have been justified in 
searching any belongings that Petitioner may have had in the car" and presumably, 
therefore the police could also have detained Simons under the lower standard. 
8 
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Respondent's Brief at 17. This argument also ignores the qualitative differences between 
the facts in Houghton and the facts in this case. 
In Houghton the police stopped a vehicle "for speeding and driving with a faulty 
brake light." Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 297. The police noticed an item of drug 
paraphernalia in the shirt pocket of the driver and ordered the passengers out of the car, 
asked them for identification, and then began searching the car for contraband. Houghton, 
526 U.S. at 298. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence discovered in her purse 
"as the fruit of a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments" and the trial court 
"held that the officer had probable cause to search the car for contraband, and, by 
extension, any containers therein that could hold such contraband." Id., at 298-99. She 
claimed the police did not have probable cause to search her purse based on the evidence 
of paraphernalia found in the driver's pocket. 
Up to the point at which the car was searched, the factual circumstances in 
Houghton were similar to this case because Simons' companion was pulled over for a 
traffic matter and paraphernalia was discovered in plain sight during that investigation. 
However, the similarities stop there. In Houghton the officers then performed a search of 
the vehicle for contraband, justified by probable cause based on the paraphernalia, and 
found a purse, which the defendant claimed was hers. Eventually the police discovered 
drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine inside the purse. Here the police did not 
continue to investigate their suspicion of DUI or paraphernalia, they stopped that 
investigation in order to investigate Simons. 
In Houghton the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the conviction by finding that 
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when the police are searching a vehicle based on probable cause, "if the officer knows or 
should know that a container is the personal effect of a passenger who is not suspected of 
criminal activity, then the container is outside the scope of the search unless someone had 
the opportunity to conceal the contraband within the personal effect to avoid detection." 
Id., at 299 {citing Houghton, 956 P.2d 363, 372 (WY. 1998)). Because the officer 
'"knew or should have known that the purse did not belong to the driver, but to one of the 
passengers,' and because 'there was no probable cause to search the passengers' personal 
effects and no reason to believe that contraband had been placed within the purse'" the 
search was illegal Id, 
The U.S. Supreme Court examined whether it mattered that the purse did not 
belong to the driver. In reversing the Wyoming court, the Supreme Court noted that 
"[t]he critical element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property is 
suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' 
to be searched for and seized are located on the property to which entry is sought." Id., at 
302 {citing lurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed2d 525 
(1978)). Thus, when the search is based on probable cause, it is not that the police have 
probable cause that a owner of the property has been involved with criminal activity and 
therefore evidence of that activity may be found on his property, rather it is that there is 
reason to suspect that evidence of criminal activity is likely to be discovered in a certain 
location, like inside a car. In support of its holding the Court noted that "a car passenger 
— unlike the unwitting tavern patron in Ybarra — will often be engaged in a common 
enterprise with the driver, and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the 
10 
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evidence of their wrongdoing." Id., at 304. The State's brief asserts that "Deputy Luke 
would have been justified in searching any belongings that [Simons] may have had in the 
car" under Houghton presumably to suggest that if the police had probable cause to 
search his containers then they certainly had reasonable suspicion to detain and 
investigate him. Respondent's Brief at 17. Under Houghton that appears to be correct. 
But here the police did not search the car or its contents as a result of discovering the 
driver's drug paraphernalia, rather they began to investigate Simons and his person. 
The Court drew the line when the issue of searching a person was considered. 
Unlike a container belonging to a passenger inside a vehicle for which there is probable 
cause to search, "the heightened protection afforded against searches of one's person" 
prohibits the police from extending such searches to a passenger's body or clothing. 
Houghton, at 303. This is where the State's appeal to Houghton breaks down. Here 
Deputy Luke did not search the vehicle based on the evidence found on the driver, rather 
Luke approached Simons at the passenger door and began investigating Simons, asking 
him what he had on his person. The principle underlying Ybarra is important even 
though it involved mere presence in a bar and this case involves mere presence in a 
vehicle. The principle in Ybarra is that, when the search warrant was issued, there was 
no reason to believe (besides proximity) that anyone else at the tavern would be violating 
the law. The same cannot be said for Pringle, when probable cause was established, the 
police had reasons beyond proximity to believe the defendant was involved in criminal 
activity related to the evidence they had discovered. And in Houghton, the defendant's 
person was not being investigated, only her property (which does not enjoy the same 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
elevated level of protection) and the property's proximity to the driver created a 
probability that contraband was hidden therein gave reason to suspect evidence of 
criminal activity would be found there. But here, evidence of the driver's impairment 
and paraphernalia is not in any way (beside proximity) evidence of criminal activity on 
the part of Simons and it could not have given the police reasonable suspicion to believe 
Simons had committed a crime. 
In Pringle the nature of the suspected criminal conduct, dealing drugs, combined 
with the proximity of the contraband to the defendant justified an inference and created 
suspicion beyond a mere hunch that the defendant was likely involved in criminal 
activity. In Houghton the nature of the search, a search of the vehicle and the containers 
found therein, allowed the police to search the defendant's purse even though the 
paraphernalia evidence justifying the search was limited to the driver. In Ybarra the 
nature of the suspected criminal conduct, possession of controlled substances, combined 
with the proximity of the defendant from the suspected contraband, in the same room as 
those reported to have drugs, did not justify an inference implicating the defendant and 
therefore did not create reasonable suspicion. And in De Ri the nature of the suspected 
criminal conduct, the driver and another passenger's possession of counterfeit gas ration 
coupons, combined with the proximity of the defendant from the suspects, in the same 
car, did not justify an inference implicating the defendant, especially where the informant 
only implicated the driver. 
Under the totality of the evidence, we see no reason to suspect that Simons, as a 
passenger, had engaged in any criminal activity. The trial court found 
12 
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In this case Deputy Luke's initial suspicion of driving while impaired was 
quickly supplemented by his observation of drug paraphernalia in plain 
sight when the car door was properly opened to remove Mr. Sorenson to 
investigate the possible DUI charge. The baggies were not only strongly 
likely to be paraphernalia, the used condition implied use of the drugs they 
might have contained. That suspicion coupled with the signs of possible 
impairment lead to reasonable suspicion and concern about both occupants 
of the car. The tactics including a quick search of Mr. Sorenson's person 
and questioning Mr. Simons about drug possession or use, followed by a 
search of his person... [] were reasonably suggested by his concerns. Once 
it was confirmed that Mr. Simons was in possession of drug paraphernalia, 
arrest and a further, concurrent search of his person was justified. Consent 
of either Defendant to the search was irrelevant and the Court makes no 
finding on that point. 
R. 47-46. The court found there was evidence the codefendant was driving impaired 
there was evidence that paraphernalia was in the car and that the bags may have 
contained drugs at an earlier time. The testimony supports each of these factual findings. 
See R. 92: 6 (Sorenson had "very watery eyes that were bloodshot", he had "very rapid 
speech and movement", he moved constantly, and blurted out "I'm not drunk"); 92: 8 
(the baggies contained white powder and crystal residues). 
The relevant legal conclusion is that, based on the driver's signs of impairment, 
the discovery of the baggies in the driver's door, and the used condition of the baggies, 
Officer Luke had reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate both the driver and 
Simons. The problem is that none of the facts observed and reported by the officer were 
particularized to Simons and the trial court's conclusion that the police had "reasonable 
suspicion and concern about both occupants of the car" ignores the requirement that the 
evidence be particularized to the individual the police detain and investigate. R.47. Here, 
the nature of the observed criminal activity, the driver's possible DUI and paraphernalia, 
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combined with the proximity of Simons to the driver and his contraband does not justify 
the inference implicating Simons in any criminal conduct and thus did not create 
reasonable suspicion to independently detain or investigate Simons. The trial court's 
conclusion was erroneous and the State's arguments are incorrect. This Court should not 
affirm the trial court's denial on this ground. 
2. The police unlawfully extended the scope of the investigation because the 
detention was measurably extended 
The State understandably titles its second section "the deputy's question to 
Petitioner did not unreasonably delay the investigation", likely to avoid the 
'measurably extend' language of the controlling cases because the State cannot confront 
the plain meaning of the controlling cases. Respondent's Brief at 18 (emphasis added). 
Instead of arguing that the police did not measurably extend the stop the State redirects 
the Court to more favorable search and seizure language. The State notes that traffic 
stops must not be "unnecessarily prolonged]" (Sharpe...), and that "the Fourth 
Amendment's ultimate touchstone is reasonableness" (Brigham City V. Stuart, 547 U.S. 
389, 389, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2006)). The State then contends that under 
the totality of the circumstances the duration of the stop was not unreasonable and 
therefore, everything within the stop was reasonable, regardless of whether it was related 
or whether any extension was measurable. See Respondent's Brief at 18-24, specifically 
at 21 (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S. Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005), 
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and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)).2 But the 
State's redirection misses the point of Simon's claims and the State's argument allows for 
individual constitutional violations to go unprotected so long as, at a distance, the 
complete picture looks like the detention did not last an unreasonable amount of time. 
This cannot be the rule. 
The State's brief fails to address the real contention of this case, which is whether 
the police can completely avoid the requirements of Hansen, Baker, and Johnson, by 
prolonging, or delaying the conclusion of, an otherwise justified stop in order to perform 
investigations that would be unlawful if performed after the justified purpose was 
concluded. In other words the State avoids the crucial questions: Could the officer in 
Hansen have delayed releasing the defendant with a warning in order to question him 
about "alcohol, drugs, or weapons"? State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 13, 63 P.3d 650. 
Was it illegal only because it occurred after he should have been free to leave? Could the 
officers in Baker have delayed arresting the driver in order to conduct an unjustified 
investigation of the passengers? Could the police in Johnson, rather than questioning the 
passengers simultaneous with the driver, have delayed investigating the driver in order to 
In Mena the additional immigration questioning did not measurably extend the duration 
of the defendant's detention during the execution of a search warrant because she was 
being detained and questioned u[w]hile the search proceeded" by other officers. Mena, 
544 U.S. 93, 96. Had the police stopped the search to interrogate her then the outcome 
would be different. 
In Caballes the deployment of the K9 unit did not measurably extend the duration of a 
level 2 detention because the dog sniff was conducted "[w]hile [the officer] was in the 
process of writing a warning ticket." Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406. Had the police 
stopped the process of administering the ticket in order to run the dog around the vehicle 
then the outcome would have been different. 
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investigate and search the passengers? Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S.Ct. 781, 
172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). 
Simons asserts that these questions are critical and that the answer to all these 
questions must be a clear NO, because regardless of whether it occurs before or after the 
conclusion of the justified stop, an additional investigation that "is not reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances that justified the inference in the first place..." {Hansen, 
2002 UT 125, Tj 29 {citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994))), nor by 
any additional evidence observed during the course of the stop is not justified and 
unreasonable. To extend the detention in order to engage in unjustified investigation 
violates the spirit of each of these cases, even if extension is brief. To focus, as the State 
does, on the brevity of the extension is a tactic used to distract from the crux of 
constitutional issues, which is whether the additional investigation is justified by 
reasonable suspicion. Further, the State's emphasis on the technical distinction, that the 
additional investigation occurs before the conclusion of the stop, is only determinative if 
the justified purpose of the stop is not interrupted by the additional investigation, as was 
the case in Johnson and Caballes, and Mena, and not the case here. 
It is telling that the State's brief fails to address the fact that the additional 
detention that occurs when Deputy Luke stops investigating the driver, the person who is 
suspected of DUI and clearly guilty of possessing paraphernalia, and begins in 
investigating Simons, the person he has no reason to suspect has done anything illegal. 
Contrary to the State's assertion that the "unrelated question" to Simons occurred "while 
Deputy Luke 'continued to investigate [the driver's] sobriety' as well as the contraband 
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possession...", in fact this investigation had stopped. Luke had the other officer just wait 
with the driver while Luke went to investigate Simons, prior to field sobriety tests, prior 
to issuing of a citation, prior to the arrest. R.92: 25 (Luke "had the assisting officer just 
stand by with Mr. Sorenson."). Just standing by is not "a means of investigation that is 
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 
(quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 
(1985)). 
The court of appeals decision strangely finds no measurable extension, no 
additional detention. Simons, 2011 UT App 251, f^ 11 ("Under these circumstances, [the 
court was] convinced that the question did not measurably extend the length of the traffic 
stop..."). It is strange because the court describes the measurable extension in the 
sentences immediately preceding the finding, where Luke is shown to have "walked 
immediately from the driver's side to the passenger side and ask Simons if he had 
anything on his person..." Id That period of time, although admittedly short, is 
measurable (like Hansen (two questions) and Baker (two minutes)), and unlike the facts 
in Johnson, Caballes, and Mena, did not occur during any other justified simultaneous 
police conduct. 
The State also seems to suggest that the Utah cases of Hansen and Chapman have 
been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Johnson. Respondent's Brief at 
24. But Simons asserts that the holdings in each of these cases are consistent with 
Johnson and, when combined with this Court's holding in Baker, demonstrate the precise 
principle that makes the detention in this case illegal. As argued in Simon's initial brief 
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(see Petitioner's Brief at 18-24), the police may detain passengers for the duration of the 
traffic stop and they must be released when the purpose of the stop concludes. If during 
the course of the stop the police begin to investigate the passengers without independent 
suspicion that investigation cannot measurably extend the duration of the stop, and a stop 
is not measurably extended if the additional investigation occurs simultaneous to the 
justified police conduct {Johnson). Once a stop is made the detention must not last 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop {State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 
446 (Utah 1996)), and something as simple and quick as two questions can constitute and 
illegal extension {Hansen). These cases continue to accurately express the constitutional 
rules and are completely consistent with each other and with the holding in Johnson. 
Despite the State's assertion, Johnson does not create a de minimus exception to the 
measurably extend rule. Instead it demonstrates the same principles demonstrated in 
Mena, Caballes, and Baker, namely, extension is about the use of the time for which 
people are detained, not about the length. If the police use detention time to quickly and 
diligently address justified suspicions and simultaneously investigate other matters, no 
unauthorized extension occurs. But if the police have a person detained, justified by one 
purpose, and use that detention in order to go fishing for evidence of other crimes instead 
of dealing with the justified purpose and the detention lasts longer than necessary, then 
the extension to the detention is not justified and is unreasonable. 
The State seems to be saying it is appropriate for the police to seize and 
investigate someone without particularized suspicion (i.e. unreasonably) if only takes a 
few extra seconds, as it did here, so long as that occurs before the justified purpose of the 
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stop is completed. Where that rationale fails is that it almost always only takes a few 
seconds for the police to obtain evidence against someone under circumstances that 
violate a person's constitutional rights. It may only take a few seconds for the police to 
discover contraband if they storm through your front door without a warrant. It may only 
takes a few seconds for the police to empty the contents of your pockets as you pass them 
on the street. Brevity is not a shield the State can hide behind in this context. 
Furthermore, if the State was correct the police would have an incentive to postpone 
concluding an arrest or citation and begin fishing for evidence of other crimes for which 
they have no reason to believe they will find just so long as they do it quickly. If the 
State is correct then the police in Baker could simply have postponed arresting the driver 
and have him "stand by" while they called the K9 in to complete the search even though 
it was unrelated and unjustified. This technical adjustment would not have saved the 
police in Baker and should not save the police here. 
The State wants this Court affirm the court of appeals' decision and create a de 
minimus exception to the 'measurably extend' rule but doing so would be counter to the 
controlling cases and would betray the spirit of our constitutional protections. The fact 
that the overall length of the stop did not become unreasonable when Luke added his 
extra investigation and because it happened before he arrested Sorenson does not change 
the fact that the extra investigation was not supported by reasonable suspicion and it did 
not occur simultaneous to the investigation/arrest of the driver. The additional 
investigation therefore measurably extended the duration of the stop without any 
justification. That extension, even though it was only a few seconds, was unreasonable 
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and unauthorized under the constitution and this Court should not approve of such 
conduct. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
In conclusion, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's 
denial of the motion to suppress was an error because it created a de minimus exception 
to the measurable extension rule contrary to the case law of this Court and the United 
States Supreme Court. The holding also authorizes and incentivized the police to 
postpone the conclusion of otherwise legitimate detentions in order to go on fishing 
expeditions to investigate matters not supported by reasonable suspicion. The trial 
court's finding that the police had "reasonable suspicion and concern about both 
occupants of the car" is also erroneous because there were no specific articulable facts 
which would have linked Simons to criminal activity, thus the trial court should not be 
upheld on those grounds. 
Petitioner now asks this Court to reverse the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
and remand this case to the District Court with order allowing Simons to withdraw his 
plea and an order suppressing any evidence discovered as a result of his illegal detention. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \T> day of /\d&ifC , 2012. 
:a^ _ 
Douglas J. ThOTipson 
AttorneyTof Petitioner/Defendant 
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